A role for ownership and authorship in the analysis of thought insertion

Abstract
Philosophers are interested in the phenomenon of thought insertion because it challenges the common assumption that one can ascribe to oneself the thoughts that one can access first-personally. In the standard philosophical analysis of thought insertion, the subject owns the ‘inserted’ thought but lacks a sense of agency towards it. In this paper we want to provide an alternative analysis of the condition, according to which subjects typically lack both ownership and authorship of the ‘inserted’ thoughts. We argue that by appealing to a failure of ownership and authorship we can describe more accurately the phenomenology of thought insertion, and distinguish it from that of non-delusional beliefs that have not been deliberated about, and of other delusions of passivity. We can also start developing a more psychologically realistic account of the relation between intentionality, rationality and self knowledge in normal and abnormal cognition.
Keywords ownership  authorship  thought insertion
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References found in this work BETA
Lisa Bortolotti (2004). Can We Interpret Irrational Behavior? Behavior and Philosophy 32 (2):359 - 375.
John Campbell (2002). The Ownership of Thoughts. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 9 (1):35-39.
Daniel C. Dennett (1992). The Self as a Center of Narrative Gravity. In Frank S. Kessel, P. M. Cole & D. L. Johnson (eds.), [Book Chapter]. Lawrence Erlbaum. 4--237.

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Citations of this work BETA
Marc Champagne (2013). Can “I” Prevent You From Entering My Mind? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (1):145-162.

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