Conversational implicatures and cancellability

Acta Analytica 24 (2):149-154 (2009)
In this paper I argue against a criticism by Matthew Weiner to Grice’s thesis that cancellability is a necessary condition for conversational implicature. I argue that the purported counterexamples fail because the supposed failed cancellation in the cases Weiner presents is not meant as a cancellation but as a reinforcement of the implicature. I moreover point out that there are special situations in which the supposed cancellation may really work as a cancellation.
Keywords Conversational implicature  Cancellability  Matthew Weiner  Paul Grice
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    Herbert Paul Grice (1967/1987). Logic and Conversation. In Paul Grice (ed.), Studies in the Way of Words. Harvard University Press. 41-58.
    Stephen Neale (1992). Paul Grice and the Philosophy of Language. Linguistics and Philosophy 15 (5):509 - 559.

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