Counterpart theory vindicated: A reply to Merricks
Dialectica 59 (1):67–73 (2005)
| Abstract | The paper shows – contra what has been argued by Trenton Merricks – that counterpart theory, when conjoined with composition as identity, does not entail mereological essentialism. What Merrick’s argument overlooks is that contingent identity is but one of the effects of grounding identity across possible worlds on similarity. | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,705 |
| External links |
  Try with proxy. |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesHarold W. Noonan (1999). Identity, Constitution and Microphysical Supervenience. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (3):273-288.
Alessandro Torza (2012). 'Identity' Without Identity. Mind 121 (481):67-95.
Delia Graff Fara (2008). Relative-Sameness Counterpart Theory. Review of Symbolic Logic 1 (2):167-189.
Elizabeth Barnes (2007). Vagueness and Arbitrariness: Merricks on Composition. Mind 116 (461):105-113.
Michael C. Rea & David Silver (2000). Personal Identity and Psychological Continuity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):185-194.
Todd Buras (2006). Counterpart Theory, Natural Properties, and Essentialism. Journal of Philosophy 103 (1):27-42.
Trenton Merricks (2003). The End of Counterpart Theory. Journal of Philosophy 100 (10):521 - 549.
Murali Ramachandran (2008). Kripkean Counterpart Theory. Polish Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):89-106.
Trenton Merricks (1999). Composition as Identity, Mereological Essentialism, and Counterpart Theory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (2):192 – 195.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads36 ( #33,057 of 549,198 )Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #25,790 of 549,198 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
