Counterpart theory vindicated: A reply to Merricks

Dialectica 59 (1):67–73 (2005)
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Abstract

The paper shows – contra what has been argued by Trenton Merricks – that counterpart theory, when conjoined with composition as identity, does not entail mereological essentialism. What Merrick’s argument overlooks is that contingent identity is but one of the effects of grounding identity across possible worlds on similarity.

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Andrea Borghini
Università degli Studi di Milano

References found in this work

Naming and Necessity: Lectures Given to the Princeton University Philosophy Colloquium.Saul A. Kripke - 1980 - Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Edited by Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel.
Philosophical explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
The Nature of Necessity.Alvin Plantinga - 1974 - Oxford, England: Clarendon Press.
Philosophical papers.David Kellogg Lewis - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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