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- Lisa Bortolotti (2009). Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs. Oxford University Press.Delusions are a common symptom of schizophrenia and dementia. Though most English dictionaries define a delusion as a false opinion or belief, there is currently a lively debate about whether delusions are really beliefs and indeed, whether they are even irrational. The book is an interdisciplinary exploration of the nature of delusions. It brings together the psychological literature on the aetiology and the behavioural manifestations of delusions, and the philosophical literature on belief ascription and rationality. The thesis of the book is that delusions are continuous with ordinary beliefs, a thesis that could have important theoretical and practical implications for psychiatric classification and the clinical treatment of subjects with delusions. By bringing together recent work in philosophy of mind, cognitive psychology and psychiatry, the book offers a comprehensive review of the philosophical issues raised by the psychology of normal and abnormal cognition, defends the doxastic conception of delusions, and develops a theory about the role of judgements of rationality and of attributions of self-knowledge in belief ascription. Presenting a highly original analysis of the debate on the nature of delusions, this book will interest philosophers of mind, epistemologists, philosophers of science, cognitive scientists, psychiatrists, and mental health professionals.Reading list | Discuss | Edit | Categorize |My bibliography
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We provide a battery of examples of delusions against which theoretical accounts can be tested. Then, we identify neuropsychological anomalies that could produce the unusual experiences that may lead, in turn, to the delusions in our battery. However, we argue against Maher’s view that delusions are false beliefs that arise as normal responses to anomalous experiences. We propose, instead, that a second factor is required to account for the transition from unusual experience to delusional belief. The second factor in the aetiology of delusions can be described superficially as a loss of the ability to reject a candidate for belief on the grounds of its implausibility and its inconsistency with everything else that the patient knows. But we point out some problems that confront any attempt to say more about the nature of this second factor.
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| | Other links: muse.jhu.edu dx.doi.org | Scholar | At my library | More options ... In this paper we defend the doxastic conception of delusions against the metacognitive account developed by Greg Currie and collaborators. According to the metacognitive model, delusions are imaginings that are misidentified by their subjects as beliefs: the Capgras patient, for instance, does not believe that his wife has been replaced by a robot, instead, he merely imagines that she has, and mistakes this imagining for a belief. We argue that the metacognitive account is untenable, and that the traditional conception of delusions as beliefs should be retained.
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| | Other links: philosophy.ox.ac.uk blackwell-synergy.com dx.doi.org | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Lisa Bortolotti argues convincingly that opponents of the doxastic view of delusion are committed to unnecessarily stringent standards for belief attribution. Folk psychology recognises many non-rational ways in which beliefs can be caused, and our attributions of delusions may be guided by a sense that delusions are beliefs that we cannot explain in any folk psychological terms.
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| | Other links: dx.doi.org | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Although delusions are typically regarded as beliefs of a certain kind, there have been worries about the doxastic conception of delusions since at least Bleuler’s time. ‘Anti-doxasticists,’ as we might call them, do not merely worry about the claim that delusions are beliefs, they reject it. Reimer’s paper weighs into the debate between ‘doxasticists’ and ‘anti-doxasticists’ by suggesting that one of the main arguments given against the doxastic conception of delusions—what we might call the functional role objection—is based on a fallacy. She also draws attention to certain parallels between delusions and what she calls “nihilistic philosophical doctrines,” such as the skeptical position that we have no ..
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| | Other links: philosophy.ox.ac.uk | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Here I reply to the main points raised by the
commentators on the arguments put forward in my
Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs (OUP, 2009).
My response is aimed at defending a modest doxastic
account of clinical delusions, and is articulated in three
sections. First, I consider the view that delusions are inbetween
perceptual and doxastic states, defended by
Jacob Hohwy and Vivek Rajan, and the view that
delusions are failed attempts at believing or not-quitebeliefs,
proposed by Eric Schwitzgebel and Maura
Tumulty. Then, I address the relationship between the
doxastic account of delusions and the role, nature, and
prospects of folk psychology, which is discussed by
Dominic Murphy, Keith Frankish, and Maura Tumulty
in their contributions. In the final remarks, I turn to the
continuity thesis and suggest that, although there are
important differences between clinical delusions and
non-pathological beliefs, these differences cannot be
characterised satisfactorily in epistemic terms.
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| | Other links: springerlink.com dx.doi.org | Scholar | At my library | More options ... In Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs, Lisa Bortolotti argues that the irrationality of delusions is no barrier to their being classified as beliefs. This comment asks how Bortolotti’s position may be affected if we accept that there are two distinct types of belief, belonging to different levels of mentality and subject to different ascriptive constraints. It addresses some worries Bortolotti has expressed about the proposed two-level framework and outlines some questions that arise for her if the framework is adopted. It also suggests that, rather than being beliefs that fail to meet the relevant standards of rationality, delusions may be non-doxastic acceptances that were never meant to meet them.
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| | Other links: dx.doi.org | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Are delusions best understood as a species of belief? Can I be deluded that p without believing that p? Because delusion is a clinical symptom, there are conflicting data at every turn. Perhaps it is best to think of delusions as beliefs not because they necessarily are beliefs, but because doing so helps patients. If one thinks that “denying that delusions are beliefs” means denying deluded patients “a voice in their own treatment” and that this would cut them off from alternative and healthier ways of thinking of themselves or the world, then one may wish to classify delusions as beliefs (see Kinderman and Bentall 2007, 288). I do not wish to classify delusions as beliefs (and I doubt ..
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| | Scholar | At my library | More options ... I argue that some cases of delusions show the inadequacy of those theories of interpretation that rely on a necessary rationality constraint on belief ascription. In particular I challenge the view that irrational beliefs can be ascribed only against a general background of rationality. Subjects affected by delusions seem to be genuine believers and their behaviour can be successfully explained in intentional terms, but they do not meet those criteria that according to Davidson (1985a) need to be met for the background of rationality to be in place.
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| Discuss | Edit | Categorize | My bibliography | Export citation | Other links: philosophy.bham.ac.uk law.manchester.ac.uk blackwell-synergy.com ingentaconnect.com dx.doi.org | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
| | Other links: philosophy.bham.ac.uk law.manchester.ac.uk blackwell-synergy.com ingentaconnect.com dx.doi.org | Scholar | At my library | More options ... In this paper, I articulate the thesis that most delusional beliefs are continuous with other irrational beliefs. Any interpreter with some knowledge about the cognitive and affective life of subjects with delusions can at least partially understand their reports, and explain and predict their behavior in intentional terms. I identify similarities and differences between this approach to the nature of delusions and the approach adopted by Rhodes and Gipps, who have recently defended the view that people with delusions do not share the same bedrock beliefs as people without (the Background Theory of Delusions).
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| | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Here I summarise the main arguments in Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs [1]. The book addresses the question whether there is a rationality constraint on belief ascription and defends a doxastic account of clinical delusions.
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| | Other links: dx.doi.org | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Discussion of Lisa Bortolotti, Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs
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