David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Mind and Language 20 (2):189-208 (2005)
I argue that some cases of delusions show the inadequacy of those theories of interpretation that rely on a necessary rationality constraint on belief ascription. In particular I challenge the view that irrational beliefs can be ascribed only against a general background of rationality. Subjects affected by delusions seem to be genuine believers and their behaviour can be successfully explained in intentional terms, but they do not meet those criteria that according to Davidson (1985a) need to be met for the background of rationality to be in place
|Keywords||Belief Delusion Epistemology Imagining Rationality|
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Citations of this work BETA
Marga Reimer (2011). A Davidsonian Perspective on Psychiatric Delusions. Philosophical Psychology 24 (5):659 - 677.
Matthew Ratcliffe (2008). The Phenomenological Role of Affect in the Capgras Delusion. Continental Philosophy Review 41 (2):195-216.
Maura Tumulty (2011). Delusions and Dispositionalism About Belief. Mind and Language 26 (5):596-628.
Garry Young (2009). In What Sense 'Familiar'? Examining Experiential Differences Within Pathologies of Facial Recognition. Consciousness and Cognition 18 (3):628-638.
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