David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Consciousness and Cognition 18 (4):952-965 (2009)
There is no satisfactory account for the general phenomenon of confabulation, for the following reasons: (1) confabulation occurs in a number of pathological and non-pathological conditions; (2) impairments giving rise to confabulation are likely to have different neural bases; and (3) there is no unique theory explaining the aetiology of confabulations. An epistemic approach to defining confabulation could solve all of these issues, by focusing on the surface features of the phenomenon. However, existing epistemic accounts are unable to offer sufficient conditions for confabulation and tend to emphasise only its epistemic disadvantages. In this paper, we argue that a satisfactory epistemic account of confabulation should also acknowledge those features which are (potentially) epistemically advantageous. For example, confabulation may allow subjects to exercise some control over their own cognitive life which is instrumental to the construction or preservation of their sense of self.
|Keywords||confabulation rationality self-knowledge|
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Citations of this work BETA
Ema Sullivan-Bissett (2015). Implicit Bias, Confabulation, and Epistemic Innocence. Consciousness and Cognition 33:548-560.
T. Parent (2016). The Empirical Case Against Infallibilism. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (1):223-242.
Lisa Bortolotti (2011). Does Reflection Lead to Wise Choices? Philosophical Explorations 14 (3):297-313.
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