Inconsistency and interpretation

Philosophical Explorations 6 (2):109-123 (2003)
In this paper my purpose is to examine whether the case of inconsistent believers can offer a reason to object to theories of belief ascription that rely on a rationality constraint. I shall first illustrate how the possibility of inconsistent believers might be a challenge for the rationality constraint and then assess Davidson's influential reply to that challenge.
Keywords Epistemology  Inconsistency  Interpretation  Davidson, D  Dennett, D
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DOI 10.1080/10002003058538743
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