Graduate studies at Western
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (3):385-392 (2005)
|Abstract||It is often taken for granted in standard theories of interpretation that there cannot be intentionality without rationality. According to the background argument, a system can be interpreted as having irrational beliefs only against a general background of rationality. Starting from the widespread assumption that delusions can be reasonably described as irrational beliefs, I argue here that the background argument fails to account for their intentional description|
|Keywords||Background Delusion Epistemology Intentionality Rationality|
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