Online research in philosophy

The monist approach to the ancient mind-body problem styled "neurophilosophy" put forward recently by Patricia Smith Churchland on the basis of latter-day advances in the neurosciences is philosophically inadequate because it does not deal with the ethical dimension of the mind. Keywords: brain, complementarity, free will, mind-body problem, neuroscience, reductionism CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this?

Philosophers and psychologists seeking an accessible introduction to current neuroscience will find much value in this volume. Befitting the neuroscientific focus on sensory processes, many essays address explicitly the binding problem. Theoretical and experimental work pertaining to the “temporal synchronicity” solution is prominent. But there are also some surprising implications for current philosophical concerns, such as the intemalism/extemalism debate about representational content, epistemological realism, a “bottom-up” approach to naturalizing intentionality, Humean concerns about the self, and implications from phantom-limb phenomena. Higher-level theorists about the mind ignore results like these from current neuroscience at their own peril, at least from the point of view of discourse worthy of serious attention as the sciences of the mind/brain push forward into the 21st century.

This collection offers an introduction to Churchland's work, as well as a critique of some of his most famous philosophical positions.

For a solid quarter century Paul Churchland and I have been wheeling around in the space of work on consciousness, and though from up close it may appear that we =ve been rather vehemently opposed to each other =s position, from the bird =s eye view, we are moving in a rather tight spiral within the universe of contested views, both staunch materialists, interested in the same phenomena and the same empirical theories of those phenomena, but differing only over where the main chance lies for progress.

This collection offers an introduction to Churchland's work, as well as a critique of some of his most famous philosophical positions.

In this collection of essays, Paul Churchland explores the unfolding impact of the several empirical sciences of the mind, especially cognitive neurobiology and computational neuroscience on a variety of traditional issues central to the discipline of philosophy. Representing Churchland's most recent research, they continue his research program, launched over thirty years ago, and which has evolved into the field of neurophilosophy.