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- Lisa Bortolotti (ed.) (2009). Philosophy and Happiness. Palgrave MacMillan.Philosophy and Happiness addresses the need to situate any meaningful discourse about happiness in a wider context of human interests, capacities and circumstances. How is happiness manifested and expressed? Can there be any happiness if no worthy life projects are pursued? How is happiness affected by relationships, illness, or cultural variants? Can it be reduced to preference satisfaction? Is it a temporary feeling or a persistent way of being? Is reflection conducive to happiness? Is mortality necessary for it? These are the questions people ask themselves when they stop and think about how they feel, how their lives are going, and how they would be going if different choices had been made or different values had been prioritized. These are the questions that contributors to this volume begin to answer, adopting different methodologies, among which the analysis of widespread intuitions about imaginary and real-life scenarios, and reflection on the interpretation of the relevant empirical evidence emerging from psychology and economics.In my reading list | Discuss this book | Edit | Categorize |My bibliography
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Preface to the Irving Singer library edition -- Preface -- Introduction: Nature and spirit -- Schopenhauer's pendulum : is happiness possible? -- Beyond the suffering in life -- The nature and content of happiness -- Play and mere existence -- Living in nature -- Imagination and idealization -- Harmonization through art -- Art and spirituality -- The continuum of ends and means -- Aesthetic foundations of ethics and religion -- Conclusion: Love, meaning, happiness.
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