Online research in philosophy

Within the general framework of the theory of direct reference, there is no agreement as to whether unactualised possible objects (from now on, possibilia) can be referred to by means of directly referential singular terms (from now on, DR terms). While some have maintained that such a direct reference can be established e.g. via some fixing-reference description (Kaplan, Salmon, and perhaps Kripke himself), others have denied any such possibility. In what follows, I will scrutinise such denials by attempting at the same time to provide some counterarguments to them. Indeed, I believe that possibilia can be referred to directly, primarily if the appropriate fixing-reference description is provided.

The papers collected in this volume shed light on the question of how linguistic expressions establish reference and anaphoric relations.

On some formulations of Direct Reference the semantic value, relative to a context of utterance, of a rigid singular term is just its referent. In response to the apparent possibility of a difference in truth value of two sentences just alike save for containing distinct but coreferential rigid singular terms, some proponents of Direct Reference have held that any two such sentences differ only pragmatically. Some have also held, more specifically, that two such sentences differ by conveying distinct conversational implicata, and that a conflation of implicatum with semantic content leads speakers to judge such sentences capable of differing in truth value. It is argued here that this latter defense of Direct Reference employs false explanans, on the ground that speakers conflate semantic content with implicatum only in quite special cases, and we have independent grounds for thinking that sentences reporting speech acts and attitudes are not cases of this sort.

As is well known, the puzzle of the unreplaceability salva veritate of allegedly co-designative directly referential terms (DRTs) within attitude reports differing just for such terms, the opacity puzzle, traditionally constitutes one of the main troubles for the theory of direct reference. According to this theory, a DRT contributes merely its referent to the truth-conditions of the sentence in which it occurs. But if report-embedded DRTs yielded merely this truth-conditional contribution, reports of the above kind would have to possess the same truth-conditions, hence there should be no problem of preserving truth across them. Thus, how can it be that truth cannot be preserved across such reports, at least in their so-called ‘opaque’ reading? Faced with this puzzle , a direct reference theorist is left with various possible solutions to it, which can be roughly gathered into two main groups: the complex and the simple ones1. I call the former solutions complex, for they constrain the direct reference theorist to invoke different modes of presentation (MPs) of one and the same referent of the embedded DRTs as being involved within the reports’ different truth-conditions (in several ways)2. The simple solutions are instead characterized by the fact that they do not involve MPs in the truth-conditional account of the reports. Among such solutions, I..

Few philosophers today doubt the importance of some notion of rigid designation, as suggested by Kripke and Putnam for names and natural kind terms. At the very least, most of us want our theories to be compatible with the most plausible elements of that account. Anaphoric theories of reference have gained some attention lately, but little attention has been given to how they square with rigid designation. Although the differences between anaphoric theories and many interpretations of the New Theory of reference are substantial, I argue that rigid designation and anaphoric theories can be reconciled with one another and in fact complement one another in important ways.

Alan Berger’s Terms and Truth covers various expressionsparticularly names and anaphoric pronouns, but also demonstratives and general termsas they occur in various linguistic contexts, including identity sentences, belief ascriptions, and negative existentials. A central thesis of Berger’s book is that all of these expressions are rigid designators. (So I assume that Berger would say, contrary to what the subtitle might suggest, that anaphoric reference is direct reference.).

Book Information Terms and Truth: Reference Direct and Anaphoric. Terms and Truth: Reference Direct and Anaphoric Alan Berger , Bradford; Cambridge MA: MIT Press , 2002 , xvii + 234 , US$35 ( cloth ) By Alan Berger. Bradford; Cambridge MA: MIT Press. Pp. xvii + 234. US$35 (cloth:).