David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Acta Analytica 22 (1):74-84 (2007)
John Locke’s distinction between primary and secondary qualities of objects has meet resistance. In this paper I bypass the traditional critiques of the distinction and instead concentrate on two specific counterexamples to the distinction: Killer yellow and the puzzle of multiple dispositions. One can accommodate these puzzles, I argue, by adopting Thomas Reid’s version of the primary/secondary quality distinction, where the distinction is founded upon conceptual grounds. The primary/secondary quality distinction is epistemic rather than metaphysical. A consequence of Reid’s primary/ secondary quality distinction is that one must deny the original version of Molyneux’s question, while one must affirm an amended version of it. I show that these two answers to Molyneux’s question are not at odds with current empirical research.
|Keywords||John Locke Thomas Reid primary/secondary quality distinction killer yellow puzzle of multiple dispositions Molyneux’s question|
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References found in this work BETA
John Locke (1995). An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Oxford University Press.
Thomas Reid (2002). Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man. Pennsylvania State University Press.
R. L. Gregory (ed.) (1998). The Oxford Companion to the Mind. Oxford University Press.
Mark N. Lance & John O'Leary-Hawthorne (1997). The Grammar of Meaning. Cambridge University Press.
Thomas Reid (1764). An Inquiry Into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense. A. Millar, and A. Kincaid & J. Bell.
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