Graduate studies at Western
|Abstract||George Sowers tries to refute the Doomsday argument on grounds that true random sampling requires all possible samples to be equally probable the time when the sample is taken. Yet the Doomsday argument does not rely on true random sampling. It presupposes random sampling only in a metaphorical sense. After arguing that Sowers’ critique fails, I outline my own view on the matter, which is that the Doomsday argument is inconclusive and that by developing a theory of observation selection effects one can show why that is so|
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