Graduate studies at Western
Economics and Philosophy 25 (2):139-152 (2009)
|Abstract||Ever since Sen criticized the notion of internal consistency of choice, there exists a widespread perception that the standard rationalizability approach to the theory of choice has difficulties in coping with the existence of external norms. We introduce a concept of norm-conditional rationalizability and show that external norms can be made compatible with the methods underlying the traditional rationalizability approach. To do so, we characterize norm-conditional rationalizability by means of suitable modifications of revealed preference axioms that are well established in the theory of rational choice on general domains as analysed in contributions by Richter and Hansson, for example. We compare our approach to alternative suggestions that have appeared in response to Sen's criticisms, and we discuss its links to Sen's notion of self-imposed choice constraints|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Thomas Sturm (2012). The “Rationality Wars” in Psychology: Where They Are and Where They Could Go. Inquiry 55 (1):66-81.
Jon Elster (1996). Rationality and the Emotions. Economic Journal 106:1386-97.
Kenneth G. Ferguson (2009). Meaning and the External World. Erkenntnis 70 (3):299 - 311.
Matthew S. Bedke (2010). Rationalist Restrictions and External Reasons. Philosophical Studies 151 (1):39 - 57.
Philip Pettit (2002). Rules, Reasons, and Norms: Selected Essays. Clarendon Press.
Isaac Levi (1997). The Covenant of Reason: Rationality and the Commitments of Thought. Cambridge University Press.
Michael E. Bratman (2011). Intention Rationality. Philosophical Explorations 12 (3):227-241.
Added to index2009-07-09
Total downloads42 ( #31,808 of 739,739 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #61,778 of 739,739 )
How can I increase my downloads?