Method and Experience

Journal of Philosophical Research 16:63-83 (1991)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

A persistent criticism of Edmund Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology is that it begs the question of its own possibiIity as science. In this essay I propose a reading of Husserl which addresses this question and attempts to show that the phenomenological ideal of freedom from all presuppositions, that is, the ideal of radical methodological autonomy, is not dogmatically assumed as valid but rests on a conception of philosophy which, although not explicitly formulated by Husserl, nevertheless informs his thinking on questions of method and, ultimately, the nature of science. According to this conception, phiIosophy, phenomenological or otherwise, is not sui generis the ground of is own possibiIity but is derived from the logic of experience itself and so is immanent to conscious, intentional life in all of its manifold occupations and interests. That is, experience ultimately fulfills itself not in the accumulation of objective facts but in its continued faithfulness to the idea of a more perfect knowledge. Thus, in the end, I hope to show that the question of the status and possibiIity of phenomenological philosophy is not of interest to phenomenologists alone but addresses the enterprise of philosophy itself.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,616

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Husserl, the absolute flow, and temporal experience.Christoph Hoerl - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (2):376-411.
Why did Husserl not become the Galileo of the science of consciousness?Andrzej Klawiter - 2004 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 82 (1):253-271.
First-person knowledge in phenomenology.Amie L. Thomasson - 2005 - In David Woodruff Smith & Amie L. Thomasson (eds.), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 115-138.
Situating phenomenology: Husserl's acceptance of the contextual powers that be.Andrew W. Lamb - 2007 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 45 (4):603-634.
Early writings in the philosophy of logic and mathematics.Edmund Husserl - 1994 - Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Edited by Dallas Willard.
Apriori and world: European contributions to Husserlian phenomenology.William R. McKenna, Robert M. Harlan & Laurence E. Winters (eds.) - 1981 - Hingham, MA: distributors for the U.S. and Canada, Kluwer Boston.

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-12-02

Downloads
57 (#251,931)

6 months
1 (#1,042,085)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references