Predictions from philosophy?
| Abstract | The purpose of this paper, boldly stated, is to propose a new type of philosophy, a philosophy whose aim is prediction. The pace of technological progress is increasing very rapidly: it looks as if we are witnessing an exponential growth, the growth-rate being proportional to the size already obtained, with scientific knowledge doubling every 10 to 20 years since the second world war, and with computer processor speed doubling every 18 months or so. It is argued that this technological development makes urgent many empirical questions which a philosopher could be well-suited to help answering. I try to cover a broad range of interesting problems and approaches, which means that I won't go at all deeply into any of them; I only try to say enough to show what some of the problems are, how one can begin to work with them, and why philosophy is relevant. My hope is that this will whet your appetite to deal with these questions, or at least increase general awareness that they worthy tasks for first-class intellects, including ones which might belong to philosophers | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | No categories specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,653 |
| External links |
  Try with proxy. |
| Through your library | Only published papers are available at libraries |
Similar books and articlesMary B. Williams (1973). Falsifiable Predictions of Evolutionary Theory. Philosophy of Science 40 (4):518-537.
Tim Crane (2005). What is the Problem of Perception? Synthesis Philosophica 2 (40):237-264.
Roger C. Buck (1963). Reflexive Predictions. Philosophy of Science 30 (4):359-369.
Michael Bishop (2002). Years of Successful Predictive Modeling Should Be Enough: Lessons for Philosophy of Science. Philosophy of Science 69 (S3):S197-S208.
Börje Ekstig (2012). Superexponentially Accelerating Evolution. World Futures 68 (1):40 - 48.
Jennie Louise (2009). I Won't Do It! Self-Prediction, Moral Obligation and Moral Deliberation. Philosophical Studies 146 (3).
Renan Springer De Freitas (1997). Back to Darwin and Popper: Criticism, Migration of Piecemeal Conceptual Schemes, and the Growth of Knowledge. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 27 (2):157-179.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads10 ( #106,175 of 548,984 )Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,327 of 548,984 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
