Quantity of experience: brain-duplication and degrees of consciousness [Book Review]

Minds and Machines 16 (2):185-200 (2006)
Abstract
If a brain is duplicated so that there are two brains in identical states, are there then two numerically distinct phenomenal experiences or only one? There are two, I argue, and given computationalism, this has implications for what it is to implement a computation. I then consider what happens when a computation is implemented in a system that either uses unreliable components or possesses varying degrees of parallelism. I show that in some of these cases there can be, in a deep and intriguing sense, a fractional (non-integer) number of qualitatively identical phenomenal experiences. This, in turn, has implications for what lessons one should draw from neural replacement scenarios such as Chalmers.
Keywords Chalmers   Computation   Consciousness   Deterministic   Duplication   Fading qualia   Implementation   Mind   Probabilistic   Program   Searle
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