Graduate studies at Western
Minds and Machines 16 (2):185-200 (2006)
|Abstract||If a brain is duplicated so that there are two brains in identical states, are there then two numerically distinct phenomenal experiences or only one? There are two, I argue, and given computationalism, this has implications for what it is to implement a computation. I then consider what happens when a computation is implemented in a system that either uses unreliable components or possesses varying degrees of parallelism. I show that in some of these cases there can be, in a deep and intriguing sense, a fractional (non-integer) number of qualitatively identical phenomenal experiences. This, in turn, has implications for what lessons one should draw from neural replacement scenarios such as Chalmers.|
|Keywords||Chalmers Computation Consciousness Deterministic Duplication Fading qualia Implementation Mind Probabilistic Program Searle|
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