Mind 108 (431):539-551 (1999)
|Abstract||A recent paper by Korb and Oliver in this journal attempts to refute the Carter-Leslie Doomsday argument. I organize their remarks into five objections and show that they all fail. Further efforts are thus called upon to find out what, if anything, is wrong with Carter and Leslie's disturbing reasoning. While ultimately unsuccessful, Korb and Oliver's objections do however in some instances force us to become clearer about what the Doomsday argument does and doesn't imply.|
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