Graduate studies at Western
Philosophical Quarterly 48 (193):523-526 (1998)
|Abstract||DH Mellor has argued that there can be no negative, disjunctive, or conjunctive properties. This argument has been criticized by Alex Oliver on the grounds that it rests on a contentious identity criterion for facts, but it seems to me that a simpler criticism is available. According to this criticism, the problem with Mellor's argument is that it trades on an ambiguity in the semantics of the phrase "the fact that", according to which "the fact that" can be understood as creating either an intensional or an extensional context.|
|Keywords||properties negative properties facts metaphysics|
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