On Chomskyan mentalism: A reply to Peter Slezak

Synthese 53 (1):123 - 141 (1982)
Abstract
Introducing his paper, Slezak (p. 428) proposes “to examine Botha's criticisms in detail with a view to demonstrating that they are without foundation and are based on the most fundamental misunderstandings”. Concluding his paper, Slezak (p. 439) expresses the hope that he has shown “that the conceptions on which these criticisms rest are so seriously flawed as to make it unprofitable to attempt to unravel the rest of his analysis”. These formulations, by all standards, represent rather strong rhetoric. But, as the preceding paragraphs have shown, Slezak's discussion sadly lacks the relevant and accurate analyses needed to give substance to his rhetoric
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Gilbert Harman (1983). Internally Represented Grammars. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):408.
Maurice Gross (1983). A Few Analogies with Computing. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):407.

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