Right and Wrong Reasons in Folk‐Psychological Explanation

International Journal of Philosophical Studies 17 (4):463 – 488 (2009)
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Abstract

Davidson argued that the fact we can have a reason for acting, and yet not be the reason why we act, requires explanation of action in terms of the agent's reasons to be causal. The present paper agrees with Dickenson (_Pacific Philosophical Quarterly_, 2007) in taking this argument to be an inference to the best explanation. However, its target phenomenon is the very existence of a case in which an agent has more than one reason, but acts exclusively becaue of one reason. Folk psychology appears to allow for this phenomenon. However, appreciation of 'rationalization' as a form of contrastive explanation reveals the existence of the Davidsonian possibility to the problematic. Claims that 'I did it because of R1, not because of R2' are entertained in folk psychology, and may be sincere or insincere. But as reports of conscious practical reasoning, even when sincere, they are not authoritative about the mechanism of motivation

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George Steven Botterill
University of Sheffield

Citations of this work

Two Kinds of Causal Explanation.George Botterill - 2010 - Theoria 76 (4):287-313.

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References found in this work

Actions, Reasons, and Causes.Donald Davidson - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685.
Contrastive Explanation.Peter Lipton - 1990 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 27:247-266.
Reasons, causes, and contrasts.Jason Dickenson - 2007 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (1):1–23.

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