Against Angles and the Fregean-Cantorian Theory of Number

Abstract How-many numbers, such as 2 and 1000, relate or are capable of expressing the size of a group or set. Both Cantor and Frege analyzed how-many number in terms of one-to-one correspondence between two sets. That is to say, one arrived at numbers by either abstracting from the concept of correspondence, in the case of Cantor, or by using it to provide an out-and-out definition, in the case of Frege.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories No categories specified (fix it)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 5,709
External links
  •   Try with proxy.
  • Through your library Only published papers are available at libraries

    Similar books and articles
    Matthew W. Parker (2009). Philosophical Method and Galileo's Paradox of Infinity. In Bart Van Kerkhove (ed.), New Perspectives on Mathematical Practices: Essays in Philosophy and History of Mathematics : Brussels, Belgium, 26-28 March 2007. World Scientfic.
    Zvonimir Šikić (1996). What Are Numbers? International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 10 (2):159 – 171.
    Zvonimir Šikić (1996). What Are Numbers? International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 10 (2):159-171.
    William Demopoulos (1994). The Contemporary Interest of an Old Doctrine. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:209 - 216.
    Anne Newstead (2001). Aristotle and Modern Mathematical Theories of the Continuum. In Demetra Sfendoni-Mentzou & James Brown (eds.), Aristotle and Contemporary Philosophy of Science. Peter Lang.
    Friederike Moltmann (forthcoming). The Number of Planets, a Number-Referring Term? In Philip A. Ebert & Marcus Rossberg (eds.), Abstractionism. Oxford University Press.

    Analytics

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index

    2010-12-22

    Total downloads

    9 ( #114,230 of 550,917 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    4 ( #19,337 of 550,917 )

    How can I increase my downloads?


    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature


    Discussion
    Start a new thread
    Order:
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.

    Other forums