A General Reply to the Arguments from Blur, Double Vision, Perspective, and Other Kinds of Perceptual Distortion Against Representationalism

Abstract
This paper offers a general reply to arguments from perceptual distortion (e.g. blur, perspective, double vision) against the representationalist thesis that the phenomenal characters of experiences supervene on their intentional contents. It has been argued that distorted and undistorted experiences are counterexamples to this thesis because they can share contents without sharing phenomenal characters. In reply, I suggest that cases of perceptual distortion do not constitute counterexamples to the representationalist thesis because the contents of distorted experiences are always impoverished in some way compared to those of normal experiences. This is can be shown by considering limit cases of perceptual distortion, for example, maximally blurry experiences, which manifestly lack detailed content. I argue that since there is no reasonable way to draw the line between distorted experiences that have degraded content and distorted experiences that don't, we should allow that an increase in distortion is always accompanied by a degradation in content. I also discuss the prospects for a positive account of the contents specific to distorted experiences, which I argue are dim, but for reasons that should not throw doubt on the representationalist thesis.
Keywords representationalism  distortion  blur blurry vision  intentionalism intentionality  perceptual content  double vision  transparency
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive David Bourget, A General Reply to the Arguments from Blur, Double Vision, Perspective, and Other Kinds of Perceptual Distortion Against Representationalism
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Similar books and articles
Jeff Speaks (2010). Attention and Intentionalism. Philosophical Quarterly 60 (239):325-342.
Alex Byrne (2009). Experience and Content. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):429-451.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2012-11-01

Total downloads

448 ( #322 of 1,096,840 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

47 ( #1,388 of 1,096,840 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.