David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (1):1-23 (2006)
Most of us would want to say that it is true that Socrates taught Plato. According to realists about past facts,1 this is made true by the fact that there is, located in the past, i.e., earlier than now, at least one real event that is the teaching of Plato by Socrates. Presentists, however, in denying that past events and facts exist2 cannot appeal to such facts to make their past-tensed statements true. So what is a presentist to do?
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Citations of this work BETA
Ben Caplan & David Sanson (2010). The Way Things Were. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):24-39.
Alex Baia (2012). Presentism and the Grounding of Truth. Philosophical Studies 159 (3):341-356.
Jonathan Tallant (2010). Time for Presence? Philosophia 38 (2):271-280.
Sam Baron (2012). Presentism and Causation Revisited. Philosophical Papers 41 (1):1-21.
Ernâni Magalhães (2011). Presentism, Persistence and Composition. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (4):509-523.
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