Consciousness is Underived Intentionality

Noûs 44 (1):32 - 58 (2010)
Representationalists argue that phenomenal states are intentional states of a special kind. This paper offers an account of the kind of intentional state phenomenal states are: I argue that they are underived intentional states. This account of phenomenal states is equivalent to two theses: first, all possible phenomenal states are underived intentional states; second, all possible underived intentional states are phenomenal states. I clarify these claims and argue for each of them. I also address objections which touch on a range of topics, including meaning holism and concept empiricism. I conclude with a brief discussion of the consequences of the proposed view for the project of naturalizing consciousness.
Keywords representationalism  intentionalism  consciousness  experience  original intentionality  derived intentionality
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2009.00730.x
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