Online research in philosophy

In order to build the collection of Cauchy reals as a set in constructive set theory, the only power set-like principle needed is exponentiation. In contrast, the proof that the Dedekind reals form a set has seemed to require more than that. The main purpose here is to show that exponentiation alone does not suffice for the latter, by furnishing a Kripke model of constructive set theory, Constructive Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory with subset collection replaced by exponentiation, in which the Cauchy reals form a set while the Dedekind reals constitute a proper class.

A Dedekind algebra is an order pair (B, h) where B is a non-empty set and h is a similarity transformation on B. Each Dedekind algebra can be decomposed into a family of disjoint, countable subalgebras called the configurations of the algebra. There are 0 isomorphism types of configurations. Each Dedekind algebra is associated with a cardinal-valued function on called its configuration signature. The configuration signature counts the number of configurations in each isomorphism type which occur in the decomposition of the algebra. Two Dedekind algebras are isomorphic iff their configuration signatures are identical. It is shown that configuration signatures can be used to characterize the homogeneous, universal and homogeneous-universal Dedekind algebras. This characterization is used to prove various results about these subclasses of Dedekind algebras.

It is a commonly held view that Dedekind’s construction of the real numbers is impredicative. This naturally raises the question of whether this impredicativity is justified by some kind of Platonism about sets. But when we look more closely at Dedekind’s philosophical views, his ontology does not look Platonist at all. So how is his construction justified? There are two aspects of the solution: one is to look more closely at his methodological views, and in particular, the places in which predicativity restrictions ought to be applied; another is to take seriously his remarks about the reals as things created by the cuts, instead of considering them to be the cuts themselves. This can lead us to make finer-grained distinctions about the extent to which impredicative definitions are problematic, since we find that Dedekind’s use of impredicative definitions in analysis can be justified by his (non-Platonist) philosophical views.

A Dedekind algebra is an ordered pair (B, h), where B is a non-empty set and h is a similarity transformation on B. Among the Dedekind algebras is the sequence of the positive integers. From a contemporary perspective, Dedekind established that the second-order theory of the sequence of the positive integers is categorical and finitely axiomatizable. The purpose here is to show that this seemingly isolated result is a consequence of more general results in the model theory of second-order languages. Each Dedekind algebra can be decomposed into a family of disjoint, countable subalgebras called the configurations of the algebra. There are ?0 isomorphism types of configurations. Each Dedekind algebra is associated with a cardinal-valued function on ? called its configuration signature. The configuration signature counts the number of configurations in each isomorphism type that occurs in the decomposition of the algebra. Two Dedekind algebras are isomorphic iff their configuration signatures are identical. The second-order theory of any countably infinite Dedekind algebra is categorical, and there are countably infinite Dedekind algebras whose second-order theories are not finitely axiomatizable. It is shown that there is a condition on configuration signatures necessary and sufficient for the second-order theory of a Dedekind algebra to be finitely axiomatizable. It follows that the second-order theory of the sequence of the positive integers is categorical and finitely axiomatizable.

A Dedekind Algebra is an ordered pair (B,h) where B is a non-empty set and h is an injective unary function on B. Each Dedekind algebra can be decomposed into a family of disjoint, countable subalgebras called configurations of the Dedekind algebra. There are N0 isomorphism types of configurations. Each Dedekind algebra is associated with a cardinal-valued function on omega called its configuration signature. The configuration signature of a Dedekind algebra counts the number of configurations in the decomposition of the algebra in each isomorphism type.The configuration signature of a Dedekind algebra encodes the structure of that algebra in the sense that two Dedekind algebras are isomorphic iff their configuration signatures are identical. Configuration signatures are used to establish various results in the first-order model theory of Dedekind algebras. These include categoricity results for the first-order theories of Dedekind algebras and existence and uniqueness results for homogeneous, universal and saturated Dedekind algebras. Fundamental to these results is a condition on configuration signatures that is necessary and sufficient for elementary equivalence.

Let T be a complete O-minimal theory in a language L. We first give an elementary proof of the result (due to Marker and Steinhorn) that all types over Dedekind complete models of T are definable. Let L * be L together with a unary predicate P. Let T * be the L * -theory of all pairs (N, M), where M is a Dedekind complete model of T and N is an |M| + -saturated elementary extension of N (and M is the interpretation of P). Using the definability of types result, we show that T * is complete and we give a simple set of axioms for T * . We also show that for every L * -formula φ(x) there is an L-formula ψ(x) such that $T^\ast \models (\forall \mathbf{x})(P(\mathbf{x}) \rightarrow (\phi(\mathbf{x}) \mapsto \psi (\mathbf{x}))$ . This yields the following result: Let M be a Dedekind complete model of T. Let φ(x, y) be an L-formula where l(y) = k. Let $\mathbf{X} = \{X \subset M^k$ : for some a in an elementary extension N of M, X = φ (a,y N ∩ M k }. Then there is a formula ψ(y, z) of L such that X = {ψ (y, b) M : b in M}.

Discusses Frege's formal definitions and characterizations of infinite and finite sets. Speculates that Frege might have discovered the "oddity" in Dedekind's famous proof that all infinite sets are Dedekind infinite and, in doing so, stumbled across an axiom of countable choice.

I begin with a personal confession. Philosophical discussions of existence have always bored me. When they occur, my eyes glaze over and my attention falters. Basically ontological questions often seem best decided by banging on the table--rocks exist, fairies do not. Argument can appear long-winded and miss the point. Sometimes a quick distinction resolves any apparent difficulty. Does a falling tree in an earless forest make noise, ie does the noise exist? Well, if noise means that an ear must be there to hear it, then the answer to the question is evidently "no." But if noise means that, if there were (counterfactually) someone there, then he would hear it, then just as obviously, the answer becomes "yes.".

On the one hand, first-order theories are able to assert the existence of objects. For instance, ZF set theory asserts the existence of objects called the power set, while Peano Arithmetic asserts the existence of zero. On the other hand, a first-order theory may or not be consistent: it is if and only if no contradiction is a theorem. Let us ask, What is the connection between consistency and existence?

As it is currently used, "foundations of arithmetic" can be a misleading expression. It is not always, as the name might indicate, being used as a plural term meaning X = {x : x is a foundation of arithmetic}. Instead it has come to stand for a philosophico-logical domain of knowledge, concerned with axiom systems, structures, and analyses of arithmetic concepts. It is a bit as if "rock" had come to mean "geology." The conflation of subject matter and its study is a serious one, because in the end, one can lose sight of what one should be doing in the first place. Perhaps it is taking matters too literally, but it seems that there is something to be said for taking the term to represent X. Doing so and accepting the term to have some kind of significance, it is then natural to focus on the question of what a foundation of arithmetic should be; and, if one exists, what one is. Whatever the case, that is what shall be done in this paper.