Hume on induction: A genuine problem or theology's trojan horse?
Philosophy 77 (1):67-86 (2002)
| Abstract | In this paper I offer a straight solution to Hume's problem of induction by defusing the assumptions on which it is based. I argue that Hume's problem only arises if we accept (i) that there is no necessity but logical necessity, or (ii) that it is unreasonable to believe that there is any form of necessity in addition to logical necessity. I show that Hume's arguments in favour of (i) and (ii) are unsound. I then offer a suggestion as to how the weakness of his arguments has escaped detection. Finally, having claimed that there remains a surmountable problem with inductive arguments, I end by characterising that problem and a possible approach to its solution. | |||||||||
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Daniel Steel (2011). On Not Changing the Problem: A Reply to Howson. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 25 (3):285 - 291.
Daniel Steel & S. Kedzie Hall (2011). What If the Principle of Induction Is Normative? Formal Learning Theory and Hume's Problem. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (2):171-185.
Alan Musgrave (2004). How Popper [Might Have] Solved the Problem of Induction. Philosophy 79 (1):19-31.
William Todd (1964). Counterfactual Conditionals and the Presuppositions of Induction. Philosophy of Science 31 (2):101-110.
John Hosack (1991). On Probabilism and Induction. Topoi 10 (2):227-229.
Chris Tucker (2009). Evidential Support, Reliability, and Hume's Problem of Induction. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (4):503-519.
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