Graduate studies at Western
Philosophia 39 (1):145-161 (2011)
|Abstract||An immunizing strategy is an argument brought forward in support of a belief system, though independent from that belief system, which makes it more or less invulnerable to rational argumentation and/or empirical evidence. By contrast, an epistemic defense mechanism is defined as a structural feature of a belief system which has the same effect of deflecting arguments and evidence. We discuss the remarkable recurrence of certain patterns of immunizing strategies and defense mechanisms in pseudoscience and other belief systems. Five different types will be distinguished and analyzed, with examples drawn from widely different domains. The difference between immunizing strategies and defense mechanisms is analyzed, and their epistemological status is discussed. Our classification sheds new light on the various ways in which belief systems may achieve invulnerability against empirical evidence and rational criticism, and we propose our analysis as part of an explanation of these belief systems’ enduring appeal and tenacity|
|Keywords||Immunizing strategies Epistemic defense mechanisms Pseudoscience Belief systems|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Richard Double (1988). What's Wrong with Self‐Serving Epistemic Strategies? Philosophical Psychology 1 (3):343-350.
Michael Williams (2007). Why (Wittgensteinian) Contextualism Is Not Relativism. Episteme 4 (1):93-114.
Andrew Chignell, The Ethics of Belief. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Richard H. Feldman (1988). Rationality, Reliability, and Natural Selection. Philosophy of Science 55 (June):218-27.
Wolfgang Lenzen (1979). Epistemologische Betrachtungen Zu [S4, S5]. Erkenntnis 14 (1):33 - 56.
Christoph Michel & Albert Newen (2010). Self-Deception as Pseudo-Rational Regulation of Belief. Consciousness and Cognition 19 (3):731-744.
Johan van Benthem (2007). Dynamic Logic for Belief Revision. Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 17 (2):129-155.
Clayton Littlejohn (2010). Moore's Paradox and Epistemic Norms. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):79 – 100.
Maarten Boudry & Johan Braeckman (2012). How Convenient! The Epistemic Rationale of Self-Validating Belief Systems. Philosophical Psychology 25 (3):341-364.
Added to index2010-05-12
Total downloads21 ( #65,392 of 739,303 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #61,243 of 739,303 )
How can I increase my downloads?