Metaphysical realism as a pre-condition of visual perception

Biology and Philosophy 19 (2):243-261 (2004)
Abstract
In this paper I present a transcendental argument based on the findings of cognitive psychology and neurophysiology which invites two conclusions: First and foremost, that a pre-condition of visual perception itself is precisely what the Aristotelian and other commonsense realists maintain, namely, the independent existence of a featured, or pre-packaged world; second, this finding, combined with other reflections, suggests that, contra McDowell and other neo-Kantians, human beings have access to things as they are in the world via non-projective perception. These two conclusions taken together form the basis of Aristotelian metaphysical realism and a refutation of the neo-Kantian two-factor approach to perception
Keywords Biology  Perception  Realism  Science  Vision
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DOI 10.1023/B:BIPH.0000024405.82013.34
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Daniel Dwyer (2013). Preconceptual Intelligibility in Perception. Continental Philosophy Review 46 (4):533-553.

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