Quantum leaps in philosophy of mind

Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (12):17--42 (2004)
I discuss the quantum mechanical theory of consciousness and freewill offered by Stapp (1993, 1995, 2000, 2004). First I show that decoherence-based arguments do not work against this theory. Then discuss a number of problems with the theory: Stapp's separate accounts of consciousness and freewill are incompatible, the interpretations of QM they are tied to are questionable, the Zeno effect could not enable freewill as he suggests because weakness of will would then be ubiquitous, and the holism of measurement in QM is not a good explanation of the unity of consciousness for essentially the same reason that local interactions may seem incapable to account for it.
Keywords quantum mechanics  consciousness  free will  stapp  zeno  decoherence
Categories (categorize this paper)
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive David Bourget, Quantum leaps in philosophy of mind
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Benjamin W. Libet (1999). Do We Have Free Will? Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (8-9):47-57.

View all 27 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

394 ( #1,809 of 1,726,249 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

33 ( #31,854 of 1,726,249 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.