David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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A chief aim of the science of consciousness is to discover general principles that determine exactly which states of phenomenal consciousness occur in exactly which conditions. In this paper I argue that making progress towards the discovery of such principles requires developing a new regimented language for describing phenomenal states. This language should allow us to describe phenomenal states in a way that is commensurable with our descriptions of physical states. I suggest one way of doing this. My approach extends and sharpens the language used in the scientific literature to describe phenomenal states. The end result is a representational language of consciousness without the metaphysical baggage of a representational theory of consciousness.
|Keywords||science of consciousness perception qualia formalization regimentation model modeling modelling galileo mathematization|
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