Supervenience and moral realism

Philosophia 27 (1-2):241-245 (1999)
Abstract
Blackburn argues that moral supervenience in conjunction with the lack of entailments from naturalistic to moral judgments poses a challenge to moral realism. Klagge and McFetridge try to avert the challenge by appealing to synthetically necessary connections between natural and moral properties. Blackburn rejoins that, even if there are such connections, the challenge still remains. We remain agnostic on the question whether there are such connections, but argue against Blackburn that, if there are indeed such connections, then the challenge to moral realism, properly phrased, does not hold up
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Ethics   Philosophy of Language   Philosophy of Mind   Philosophy of Science
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DOI 10.1007/BF02381004
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References found in this work BETA
I. G. McFetridge (1985). Supervenience, Realism, Necessity. Philosophical Quarterly 35 (140):245-258.

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Citations of this work BETA
Jordan Howard Sobel (2001). Blackburn's Problem: On its Not Insignificant Residue. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):361-383.

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