Graduate studies at Western
In Duncan Pritchard & Sven Bernecker (eds.), Routledge Companion to Epistemology. Routledge (forthcoming)
|Abstract||Bayesian epistemology addresses epistemological problems with the help of the mathematical theory of probability. It turns out that the probability calculus is especially suited to represent degrees of belief (credences) and to deal with questions of belief change, confirmation, evidence, justification, and coherence. Compared to the informal discussions in traditional epistemology, Bayesian epis- temology allows for a more precise and fine-grained analysis which takes the gradual aspects of these central epistemological notions into account. Bayesian epistemology therefore complements traditional epistemology; it does not re- place it or aim at replacing it.|
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