Deleuze's Neo-Leibnizianism, Events and The Logic of Sense's 'Static Ontological Genesis'

Deleuze Studies 4 (3):301-328 (2010)
In The Logic of Sense, Deleuze effectively argues that two types of relation between events govern their ‘evental’ or ‘ideal play’, and ultimately underlie determined substances, that is, worldly individuals and persons. Leibniz calls these relations ‘compossibility’ and ‘incompossibility’. Deleuze calls them ‘convergence’ and ‘divergence’. This paper explores how Deleuze appropriates and extends a number of Leibnizian concepts in order to ground the idea that events have ontological priority over substances ‘all the way down’.
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References found in this work BETA
Lang Baker (1995). The Cry of the Identicals. Philosophy Today 39 (2):198-211.
Donald Davidson (1991). Three Varieties of Knowledge. In A. Phillips Griffiths (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. New York: Cambridge University Press 153-166.
G. Deleuze (2000). The Logic of Sense. Filosoficky Casopis 48 (5):799-808.

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