Utilitarian Epistemology
| Abstract | Standard epistemology has it that there is a particularly epistemic type of value. A belief might be disastrous in many other ways; it might bring about great misery, and be horribly ugly to contemplate, and even cause you to forget many other important things. If that belief is an instance of knowledge, though, then it is valuable in at least one important way—epistemically.1 That such special epistemic value exists is a normative claim, and it had better be consonant with one’s overall theory of value. If one is a Kantian about value, it is easy to make room for an epistemic dimension; epistemic value is (roughly) from forming correct intentions with respect to believing. It is also easy to accommodate epistemic value if one is an Aristotelian; epistemic value inheres in stably virtuous epistemic habits. Both such pictures of epistemic value have dedicated proponents.2 According to what we might call “classical” act-utilitarianism, though, the only thing of value is welfare, and individual acts are only good instrumentally, insofar as they contribute to it. Thus it seems impossible for such a utilitarian to account for particularly epistemic value. If some belief brings about more misery than happiness, it is of disvalue, however true, justified, etc. it may be. Nonetheless, I think the utilitarian can do epistemology. In fact, I think a utilitarian account of epistemic value provides a powerful approach to puzzles that arise on the other two pictures. I sketch such an account and its potential implications here. | |||||||||
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