An Interpretation of Principled Morality

Journal of Moral Education 8 (2):110-123 (1979)
Abstract The commonly used notion of principled morality is interpreted philosophically and psychologically. Five sets of philosophical assumptions embedded in this notion are identified, dealing with the purpose of morality, the place of reason in morality, the autonomy of the moral agent, the autonomy of moral discourse and the nature of moral principles. An attempt is made to make these assumptions more meaningful to the non?philosophical reader by offering a phenomenological account of how they might be reflected in the real processes of moral judgment. The interpretation emphasizes the dynamic nature of principled moral judgment
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DOI 10.1080/0305724790080205
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