David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Ratio 27 (3):29-41 (2014)
The problem of multi-peer disagreement concerns the reasonable response to a situation in which you believe P1 … Pn and disagree with a group of ‘epistemic peers’ of yours, who believe ∼P1 … ∼Pn, respectively. However, the problem of multi-peer disagreement is a variant on the preface paradox; because of this the problem poses no challenge to the so-called ‘steadfast view’ in the epistemology of disagreement, on which it is sometimes reasonable to believe P in the face of peer disagreement about P. After some terminology is defined (§1), Peter van Inwagen's challenge to the steadfast view will be presented (§2). The preface paradox will then be presented and diagnosed (§3), and it will be argued that van Inwagen's challenge relies on the same principle that generates the preface paradox (§4). The reasonable response to multi-peer disagreement will be discussed (§5), and an objection addressed (§6)
|Keywords||disagreement preface paradox|
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References found in this work BETA
David Christensen (2007). Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News. Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.
Adam Elga (2007). Reflection and Disagreement. Noûs 41 (3):478–502.
David Christensen (2004). Putting Logic in its Place: Formal Constraints on Rational Belief. Oxford University Press.
Richard Feldman (2006). Epistemological Puzzles About Disagreement. In Stephen Hetherington (ed.), Epistemology Futures. Oxford University Press 216-236.
Roger White (2005). Epistemic Permissiveness. Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):445–459.
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