Scientific realism
| Abstract | It is easier to define scientific realism than it is to identify its role as a distinctly philosophical doctrine. Scientific realists hold that the characteristic product of successful scientific research is knowledge of largely theory-independent phenomena and that such knowledge is possible (indeed actual) even in those cases in which the relevant phenomena are not, in any non-question-begging sense, observable. According to scientific realists, for example, if you obtain a good contemporary chemistry textbook you will have good reason to believe (because the scientists whose work the book reports had good scientific evidence for) the (approximate) truth of the claims it contains about the existence and properties of atoms, molecules, sub-atomic particles, energy levels, reaction mechanisms, etc. Moreover, you have good reason to think that such phenomena have the properties attributed to them in the textbook independently of our theoretical conceptions in chemistry. Scientific realism is thus the common sense (or common science) conception that, subject to a recognition that scientific methods are fallible and that most scientific knowledge is approximate, we are justified in accepting the most secure findings of scientists "at face value." 1. Introduction 2. The Empiricist Challenge: Knowledge Empiricism and the Underdetermination Argument 3. Realist Responses to the Empiricist Challenge: The Senses Extended and Explanations Rehabilitated 4. The Neo-Kantian Challenge: First Version 5. The Neo-Kantian Challenge: Second Version 6. The "Post-modern" Challenge Bibliography Other Internet Resources Related Entries. | |||||||||
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Uskali Mäki (2011). Scientific Realism as a Challenge to Economics (and Vice Versa). Journal of Economic Methodology 18 (01):1-12.
Roger Jones (1988). Scientific Realism in Real Science. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:167 - 178.
Jarrett Leplin (1997). A Novel Defense of Scientific Realism. Oxford University Press.
Bas C. van Fraassen (2003). On McMullin's Appreciation of Realism Concerning the Sciences. Philosophy of Science 70 (3):479-492.
Bas C. van Fraassen (2003). On McMullin's Appreciation of Realism Concerning the Sciences. Philosophy of Science 70 (3):479-492.
Anjan Chakravartty (2007). A Metaphysics for Scientific Realism: Knowing the Unobservable. Cambridge University Press.
Howard Sankey (2001). Scientific Realism: An Elaboration and a Defence. Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory 98 (98):35-54.
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