Scientific Realism and Naturalistic Epistemology

Abstract
A realistic and dialectical conception of the epistemology of science is advanced according to which the acquisition of instrumental knowledge is parasitic upon the acquisition, by successive approximation, of theoretical knowledge. This conception is extended to provide an epistemological characterization of reference and of natural kinds, and it is integrated into recent naturalistic treatments of knowledge. Implications for several current issues in the philosophy of science are explored
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Gerald Doppelt (2014). Best Theory Scientific Realism. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 4 (2):271-291.

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