Graduate studies at Western
Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):223-241 (2011)
|Abstract||I distinguish two ways of explaining our capacity for ‘transparent’ knowledge of our own present beliefs, perceptions, and intentions: an inferential and a reflective approach. Alex Byrne (2011) has defended an inferential approach, but I argue that this approach faces a basic difficulty, and that a reflective approach avoids the difficulty. I conclude with a brief sketch and defence of a reflective approach to our transparent self-knowledge, and I show how this approach is connected with the thesis that we must distinguish between a kind of self-knowledge that is of oneself as agent and another kind that is of oneself as patient|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Kieran Setiya (2012). Transparency and Inference. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (2pt2):263-268.
Francois-Igor Pris, The Instinctive Knowledge Without the Reflective Knowledge, and Vice Versa (in Russian).
Matthew Boyle (2009). Two Kinds of Self-Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (1):133-164.
Michael DePaul (2011). Sosa, Certainty and the Problem of the Criterion. Philosophical Papers 40 (3):287-304.
Alex Byrne (2011). Transparency, Belief, Intention. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):201-221.
Delia Graff (2002). An Anti-Epistemicist Consequence of Margin for Error Semantics for Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1):127–142.
Ernest Sosa (2009). A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Volume I. OUP Oxford.
Josep Corbí (2011). Observation, Character, and A Purely First-Person Point of View. Acta Analytica 26 (4):311-328.
Josep CorbÃ (2011). Observation, Character, and A Purely First-Person Point of View. Acta Analytica 26 (4):311-328.
Declan Smithies (2012). Mentalism and Epistemic Transparency. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):723-741.
Barry Barnes (1977). Interests and the Growth of Knowledge. Routledge and K. Paul.
Charlotte Emily Hanson (2010). The Epistemological Significance of Reflective Access. Dissertation, University of Stirling
Pablo Cobreros, Paul Egre, Robert van Rooij & David Ripley (forthcoming). Reaching Transparent Truth. Mind.
Huiming Ren (2012). The Distinction Between Knowledge-That and Knowledge-How. Philosophia 40 (4):857-875.
Added to index2011-05-18
Total downloads196 ( #1,821 of 751,289 )
Recent downloads (6 months)9 ( #11,489 of 751,289 )
How can I increase my downloads?