Transparent Self-Knowledge

Abstract
I distinguish two ways of explaining our capacity for ‘transparent’ knowledge of our own present beliefs, perceptions, and intentions: an inferential and a reflective approach. Alex Byrne (2011) has defended an inferential approach, but I argue that this approach faces a basic difficulty, and that a reflective approach avoids the difficulty. I conclude with a brief sketch and defence of a reflective approach to our transparent self-knowledge, and I show how this approach is connected with the thesis that we must distinguish between a kind of self-knowledge that is of oneself as agent and another kind that is of oneself as patient
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References found in this work BETA
Matthew Boyle (2009). Active Belief. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (sup1):119-147.
Matthew Boyle (2009). Two Kinds of Self-Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (1):133-164.
Alex Byrne (2005). Introspection. Philosophical Topics 33 (1):79-104.
Alex Byrne (2011). Transparency, Belief, Intention. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):201-221.
Fred Dretske (1994). Introspection. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 94:263-278.

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Citations of this work BETA
Markos Valaris (2011). Transparency as Inference: Reply to Alex Byrne. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (2pt2):319-324.
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