Journal of Logic, Language and Information 15 (1-2):65-81 (2006)
|Abstract||Adams' famous thesis that the probabilities of conditionals are conditional probabilities is incompatible with standard probability theory. Indeed it is incompatible with any system of monotonic conditional probability satisfying the usual multiplication rule for conditional probabilities. This paper explores the possibility of accommodating Adams' thesis in systems of non-monotonic probability of varying strength. It shows that such systems impose many familiar lattice theoretic properties on their models as well as yielding interesting logics of conditionals, but that a standard complementation operation cannot be defined within them, on pain of collapsing probability into bivalence.|
|Keywords||Conditionals non-monotonic logic axiomatic probability theory Adams' Thesis|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
James Hawthorne (2007). Nonmonotonic Conditionals That Behave Like Conditional Probabilities Above a Threshold. Journal of Applied Logic 5 (4):625-637.
Carl G. Wagner (2004). Modus Tollens Probabilized. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (4):747-753.
James Hawthorne (1996). On the Logic of Nonmonotonic Conditionals and Conditional Probabilities. Journal of Philosophical Logic 25 (2):185-218.
Stefan Kaufmann (2004). Conditioning Against the Grain. Journal of Philosophical Logic 33 (6):583-606.
Robert C. Stalnaker (1970). Probability and Conditionals. Philosophy of Science 37 (1):64-80.
Paul Weirich (1983). Conditional Probabilities and Probabilities Given Knowledge of a Condition. Philosophy of Science 50 (1):82-95.
Richard Bradley (2002). Indicative Conditionals. Erkenntnis 56 (3):345-378.
Charles G. Morgan & Edwin D. Mares (1995). Conditionals, Probability, and Non-Triviality. Journal of Philosophical Logic 24 (5):455-467.
Ellery Eells, Brian Skyrms & Ernest W. Adams (eds.) (1994). Probability and Conditionals: Belief Revision and Rational Decision. Cambridge University Press.
Richard Bradley (1999). More Triviality. Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (2):129-139.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads27 ( #51,640 of 722,826 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #60,541 of 722,826 )
How can I increase my downloads?