Are Foxall's Intentions Good?

Behavior and Philosophy 35:61 - 64 (2007)
Abstract
Foxall's argument that behavioristic and intentional approaches should be hybridized rests on his views about the inability of a behavioristic position to deal with several features of behavior, including its continuity through time. My commentary suggests that Foxall's reservations about the inadequacies of a behavioristic position are overstated. A behavioristic approach can incorporate many of the features of behavior said to embody intention. However, the radical-behavioristic approach to the continuity of behavior through time is highly unconventional, permitting provisional temporal gaps in cause–effect sequences.
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