A paradox for some theories of welfare
Philosophical Studies 133 (1):45 - 53 (2007)
| Abstract | Sometimes people desire that their lives go badly, take pleasure in their lives going badly, or believe that their lives are going badly. As a result, some popular theories of welfare are paradoxical. I show that no attempt to defend those theories from the paradox fully succeeds. | |||||||||
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