A paradox for some theories of welfare

Philosophical Studies 133 (1):45 - 53 (2007)
Abstract
Sometimes people desire that their lives go badly, take pleasure in their lives going badly, or believe that their lives are going badly. As a result, some popular theories of welfare are paradoxical. I show that no attempt to defend those theories from the paradox fully succeeds.
Keywords Value  Welfare  Desire  Hedonism  Paradox
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    Chris Heathwood (2005). The Problem of Defective Desires. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (4):487 – 504.

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