David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Theory and Decision 45 (3):263-289 (1998)
A cornerstone of game theory is backward induction, whereby players reason backward from the end of a game in extensive form to the beginning in order to determine what choices are rational at each stage of play. Truels, or three-person duels, are used to illustrate how the outcome can depend on (1) the evenness/oddness of the number of rounds (the parity problem) and (2) uncertainty about the endpoint of the game (the uncertainty problem). Since there is no known endpoint in the latter case, an extension of the idea of backward induction is used to determine the possible outcomes. The parity problem highlights the lack of robustness of backward induction, but it poses no conflict between foundational principles. On the other hand, two conflicting views of the future underlie the uncertainty problem, depending on whether the number of rounds is bounded (the players invariably shoot from the start) or unbounded (they may all cooperate and never shoot, despite the fact that the truel will end with certainty and therefore be effectively bounded). Some real-life examples, in which destructive behavior sometimes occurred and sometimes did not, are used to illustrate these differences, and some ethical implications of the analysis are discussed
|Keywords||Backward induction Bounded rationality Continuation probability Infinite horizon Parity Uncertainty|
No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Thorsten Clausing (2003). Doxastic Conditions for Backward Induction. Theory and Decision 54 (4):315-336.
Wlodek Rabinowicz (1998). Grappling With the Centipede: Defence of Backward Induction for BI-Terminating Games. Economics and Philosophy 14 (01):95-.
Christian W. Bach & Conrad Heilmann (2011). Agent Connectedness and Backward Induction. International Game Theory Review 13 (2):195-208.
John Broome & Wlodek Rabinowicz (1999). Backwards Induction in the Centipede Game. Analysis 59 (264):237–242.
Cristina Bicchieri (1988). Backward Induction Without Common Knowledge. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:329 - 343.
Joe Mintoff (1999). Decision-Making and the Backward Induction Argument. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (1):64–77.
John W. Carroll (2000). The Backward Induction Argument. Theory and Decision 48 (1):61-84.
Gerhard Schurz, Local, General and Universal Prediction Strategies: A Game-Theoretical Approach to the Problem of Induction.
Ken Binmore (2011). Interpreting Knowledge in the Backward Induction Problem. Episteme 8 (3):248-261.
Magnus Jiborn & Wlodek Rabinowicz (2003). Reconsidering the Foole's Rejoinder: Backward Induction in Indefinitely Iterated Prisoner's Dilemmas. Synthese 136 (2):135 - 157.
Wlodek Rabinowicz (2001). A Centipede for Intransitive Preferrers. Studia Logica 67 (2):167-178.
Jared Bates (2005). The Old Problem of Induction and the New Reflective Equilibrium. Dialectica 59 (3):347–356.
Giacomo Bonanno (2001). Branching Time, Perfect Information Games and Backward Induction. Games and Economic Behavior 36 (1):57-73.
William Todd (1964). Counterfactual Conditionals and the Presuppositions of Induction. Philosophy of Science 31 (2):101-110.
Michael Bacharach (1992). Backward Induction and Beliefs About Oneself. Synthese 91 (3):247 - 284.
Added to index2010-09-02
Total downloads7 ( #174,155 of 1,096,425 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #87,121 of 1,096,425 )
How can I increase my downloads?