Graduate studies at Western
Dialectica 64 (2):247-250 (2010)
|Abstract||Colin Howson (1995 ) offers a counter-example to the rule of conditionalization. I will argue that the counter-example doesn't hit its target. The problem is that Howson mis-describes the total evidence the agent has. In particular, Howson overlooks how the restriction that the agent learn 'E and nothing else' interacts with the de se evidence 'I have learnt E'.|
|Keywords||Diachronic Dutch Book Self-location Bayesian|
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