Conditionalization and Belief De Se

Dialectica 64 (2):247-250 (2010)
Abstract
Colin Howson (1995 ) offers a counter-example to the rule of conditionalization. I will argue that the counter-example doesn't hit its target. The problem is that Howson mis-describes the total evidence the agent has. In particular, Howson overlooks how the restriction that the agent learn 'E and nothing else' interacts with the de se evidence 'I have learnt E'.
Keywords Diachronic Dutch Book  Self-location  Bayesian
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References found in this work BETA
William P. Alston (1980). Level-Confusions in Epistemology. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1):135-150.
I. J. Good (1967). On the Principle of Total Evidence. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 17 (4):319-321.

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