Graduate studies at Western
Minds and Machines 8 (4):479-508 (1998)
|Abstract||The nature of complex concepts has important implications for the computational modelling of the mind, as well as for the cognitive science of concepts. This paper outlines the way in which RVC â a Relational View of Concepts â accommodates a range of complex concepts, cases which have been argued to be non-compositional. RVC attempts to integrate a number of psychological, linguistic and psycholinguistic considerations with the situation-theoretic view that information-carrying relations hold only relative to background situations. The central tenet of RVC is that the content of concepts varies systematically with perspective. The analysis of complex concepts indicates that compositionality too should be considered to be sensitive to perspective. Such a view accords with concepts and mental states being situated and the implications for theories of concepts and for computational models of the mind are discussed|
|Keywords||Composition Concept Mind Model Science Situation|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence (2011). Learning Matters: The Role of Learning in Concept Acquisition. Mind and Language 26 (5):507-539.
Jerry A. Fodor & Ernest LePore (1996). The Red Herring and the Pet Fish: Why Concepts Still Can't Be Prototypes. Cognition 58:253-70.
Mukesh J. Patel (1994). Concept Formation: A Complex Adaptative Approach. Theoria 9 (1):89-108.
Jerry Fodor & Ernie Lepore (2001). Why Compositionality Won't Go Away: Reflections on Horwich's 'Deflationary' Theory. Ratio 14 (4):350–368.
Dale Jacquette (2011). Intentionality as a Conceptually Primitive Relation. Acta Analytica 26 (1):15-35.
Douglas Patterson (2005). Learnability and Compositionality. Mind and Language 20 (3):326–352.
Derek Ball (2009). There Are No Phenomenal Concepts. Mind 118 (472):935-962.
Collin Rice (2013). Concept Empiricism, Content, and Compositionality. Philosophical Studies 162 (3):567-583.
Diana I. Pérez (2011). Phenomenal Concepts, Color Experience, and Mary's Puzzle. Teorema (3):113-133.
Paul R. Thagard (1990). Concepts and Conceptual Change. Synthese 82 (2):255-74.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads22 ( #62,935 of 753,568 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,000 of 753,568 )
How can I increase my downloads?