Graduate studies at Western
Philosophy of Science 67 (3):32 (2000)
|Abstract||In this paper Richard Jeffrey's 'Logic of Decision' is extended by examination of agents' attitudes to the sorts of possibilities identified by indicative conditional sentences. An expression for the desirability of conditionals is proposed and, along with Adams' thesis that the probability of a conditional equals the conditional probability of its antecedent given its consequent, is defended by informally deriving it from Jeffrey's notion of desirability and some weak constraints on rational preference for conditional possibilities. Finally a statement is given of a representation theorem establishing the conditions under which a rational agent's preferences for conditionals determines the existence of unique measures (up to choice of scale) of her degrees of belief and desire|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Hannes Leitgeb (2007). Beliefs in Conditionals Vs. Conditional Beliefs. Topoi 26 (1):115-132.
Ellery Eells, Brian Skyrms & Ernest W. Adams (eds.) (1994). Probability and Conditionals: Belief Revision and Rational Decision. Cambridge University Press.
James Hawthorne (1996). On the Logic of Nonmonotonic Conditionals and Conditional Probabilities. Journal of Philosophical Logic 25 (2):185-218.
Richard Bradley (2006). Adams Conditionals and Non-Monotonic Probabilities. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 15 (1-2):65-81.
Richard Bradley (2007). A Unified Bayesian Decision Theory. Theory and Decision 63:233-263,.
Frank Jackson (ed.) (1991). Conditionals. Oxford University Press.
Richard Bradley (1999). Conditional Desirability. Theory and Decision 47 (1):23-55.
Richard Bradley (1998). A Representation Theorem for a Decision Theory with Conditionals. Synthese 116 (2):187-229.
Richard Bradley (2002). Indicative Conditionals. Erkenntnis 56 (3):345-378.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads8 ( #131,868 of 739,396 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #61,680 of 739,396 )
How can I increase my downloads?