David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (2):323-342 (2011)
Sometimes we learn what the world is like, and sometimes we learn where in the world we are. Are there any interesting differences between the two kinds of cases? The main aim of this article is to argue that learning where we are in the world brings into view the same kind of observation selection effects that operate when sampling from a population. I will first explain what observation selection effects are ( Section 1 ) and how they are relevant to learning where we are in the world ( Section 2 ). I will show how measurements in the Many Worlds Interpretation of quantum mechanics can be understood as learning where you are in the world via some observation selection effect ( Section 3 ). I will apply a similar argument to the Sleeping Beauty Problem ( Section 4 ) and explain what I take the significance of the analogy to be ( Section 5 ). Finally, I will defend the Restricted Principle of Indifference on which some of my arguments depend ( Section 6 )
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References found in this work BETA
L. Bovens & J. L. Ferreira (2010). Monty Hall Drives a Wedge Between Judy Benjamin and the Sleeping Beauty: A Reply to Bovens. Analysis 70 (3):473-481.
Adam Elga (2000). Self-Locating Belief and the Sleeping Beauty Problem. Analysis 60 (2):143–147.
Berry Groisman (2008). The End of Sleeping Beauty's Nightmare. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (3):409-416.
David Lewis (2001). Sleeping Beauty: Reply to Elga. Analysis 61 (3):171–76.
Peter J. Lewis (2010). A Note on the Doomsday Argument. Analysis 70 (1):27-30.
Citations of this work BETA
Darren Bradley (2011). Self-Location is No Problem for Conditionalization. Synthese 182 (3):393-411.
Michael G. Titelbaum (2013). Ten Reasons to Care About the Sleeping Beauty Problem. Philosophy Compass 8 (11):1003-1017.
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