Confirmation in a Branching World: The Everett Interpretation and Sleeping Beauty
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (2):323-342 (2011)
| Abstract | Sometimes we learn what the world is like, and sometimes we learn where in the world we are. Are there any interesting differences between the two kinds of cases? The main aim of this article is to argue that learning where we are in the world brings into view the same kind of observation selection effects that operate when sampling from a population. I will first explain what observation selection effects are ( Section 1 ) and how they are relevant to learning where we are in the world ( Section 2 ). I will show how measurements in the Many Worlds Interpretation of quantum mechanics can be understood as learning where you are in the world via some observation selection effect ( Section 3 ). I will apply a similar argument to the Sleeping Beauty Problem ( Section 4 ) and explain what I take the significance of the analogy to be ( Section 5 ). Finally, I will defend the Restricted Principle of Indifference on which some of my arguments depend ( Section 6 ) | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
  |
| External links |
 Try with proxy. Try with proxy. |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesFernando Birman (2009). Quantum Mechanics, Correlations, and Relational Probability. Critica 41 (1):3-22.
Patrick Hawley (2013). Inertia, Optimism and Beauty. Noûs 47 (1):85-103.
Simon Saunders & D. Wallace (2008). Branching and Uncertainty. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (3):293 - 305.
David Papineau & Víctor Durà-Vilà (2009). A Thirder and an Everettian: A Reply to Lewis's 'Quantum Sleeping Beauty'. Analysis 69 (1):78-86.
Daniel Peterson (2011). Qeauty and the Books: A Response to Lewis's Quantum Sleeping Beauty Problem. Synthese 181 (3):367-374.
Peter J. Lewis (2007). Quantum Sleeping Beauty. Analysis 67 (293):59-65.
D. J. Bradley (2012). Four Problems About Self-Locating Belief. Philosophical Review 121 (2):149-177.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2010-02-22Total downloads66 ( #13,578 of 548,969 )Recent downloads (6 months)27 ( #1,713 of 548,969 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
