David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
In A. Capone & N. Feit (eds.), Attitudes De Se. University of Chicago (2013)
How should our beliefs change over time? Much has been written about how our beliefs should change in the light of new evidence. But that is not the question I’m asking. Sometimes our beliefs change without new evidence. I previously believed it was Sunday. I now believe it’s Monday. In this paper I discuss the implications of such beliefs for philosophy of language. I will argue that we need to allow for ‘dynamic’ beliefs, that we need new norms of belief change to model how they function, and that this gives Perry’s (1977) two tier account the advantage over Lewis’s (1979) theory
|Keywords||Self-locating belief Belief de se Dynamic Beliefs|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Clas Weber (2013). Centered Communication. Philosophical Studies 166 (1):205-223.
Sven Ove Hansson & Renata Wassermann (2002). Local Change. Studia Logica 70 (1):49 - 76.
Steven L. Reynolds (2011). Doxastic Voluntarism and the Function of Epistemic Evaluations. Erkenntnis 75 (1):19-35.
Daniel Howard-Snyder & John O'Leary-Hawthorne (1996). Are Beliefs About God Theoretical Beliefs? Reflections on Aquinas and Kant. Religious Studies 32 (2):233 - 258.
Darren Bradley (2011). Self-Location is No Problem for Conditionalization. Synthese 182 (3):393-411.
Hannes Leitgeb (2007). Beliefs in Conditionals Vs. Conditional Beliefs. Topoi 26 (1):115-132.
Nir Friedman & Joseph Y. Halpern (1999). Belief Revision: A Critique. [REVIEW] Journal of Logic, Language and Information 8 (4):401-420.
Giacomo Bonanno (2011). AGM Belief Revision in Dynamic Games. In Krzysztof Apt (ed.), Proceedings of the 13th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK XIII).
Darren Bradley (2007). Bayesianism And Self-Locating Beliefs. Dissertation, Stanford University
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads164 ( #20,236 of 1,790,232 )
Recent downloads (6 months)30 ( #27,122 of 1,790,232 )
How can I increase my downloads?