In A. Capone & N. Feit (eds.), Attitudes De Se. University of Chicago (2013)
|Abstract||How should our beliefs change over time? Much has been written about how our beliefs should change in the light of new evidence. But that is not the question I’m asking. Sometimes our beliefs change without new evidence. I previously believed it was Sunday. I now believe it’s Monday. In this paper I discuss the implications of such beliefs for philosophy of language. I will argue that we need to allow for ‘dynamic’ beliefs, that we need new norms of belief change to model how they function, and that this gives Perry’s (1977) two tier account the advantage over Lewis’s (1979) theory|
|Keywords||Self-locating belief Belief de se Dynamic Beliefs|
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