Degrees of causation
Erkenntnis 71 (3):323 - 344 (2009)
| Abstract | The primary aim of this paper is to analyze the concept of degrees of causal contribution for actual events and examine the way in which it can be formally defined. This should go some way to filling out a gap in the legal and philosophical literature on causation. By adopting the conception of a cause as a necessary element of a sufficient set (the so-called NESS test) we show that the concept of degrees of causation can be given clear and even empirical meaning. We then apply a game theoretical framework to derive a measure of causal contribution. Our favoured measure turns out to be a generalised version of the normalized Penrose–Banzhaf index of voting power. | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | No categories specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,679 |
| External links |
 |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesMathias Frisch (2010). Causes, Counterfactuals, and Non-Locality. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (4):655-672.
Jeanleah Mohrherr (1983). Kleene Index Sets and Functional M-Degrees. Journal of Symbolic Logic 48 (3):829-840.
Su Gao (1994). The Degrees of Conditional Problems. Journal of Symbolic Logic 59 (1):166-181.
Franz Huber (2009). Belief and Degrees of Belief. In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Springer.
Michael S. Moore (2009). Causation and Responsibility: An Essay in Law, Morals, and Metaphysics. OUP Oxford.
Guohua Wu (2004). Bi-Isolation in the D.C.E. Degrees. Journal of Symbolic Logic 69 (2):409 - 420.
Menno Hulswit (2005). How Causal is Downward Causation? Journal for General Philosophy of Science 36 (2):261 - 287.
Christopher Hitchcock & Joshua Knobe (2009). Cause and Norm. Journal of Philosophy 106 (11):587-612.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-08-26Total downloads49 ( #21,760 of 549,087 )Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #25,722 of 549,087 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
