Degrees of causation

Erkenntnis 71 (3):323 - 344 (2009)
Abstract
The primary aim of this paper is to analyze the concept of degrees of causal contribution for actual events and examine the way in which it can be formally defined. This should go some way to filling out a gap in the legal and philosophical literature on causation. By adopting the conception of a cause as a necessary element of a sufficient set (the so-called NESS test) we show that the concept of degrees of causation can be given clear and even empirical meaning. We then apply a game theoretical framework to derive a measure of causal contribution. Our favoured measure turns out to be a generalised version of the normalized Penrose–Banzhaf index of voting power.
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    References found in this work BETA
    Joel Feinberg (1968). Collective Responsibility. Journal of Philosophy 65 (21):674-688.
    David Lewis (2000). Causation as Influence. Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):182-197.
    David Lewis (2004). Void and Object. In John Collins, Ned Hall & L. A. Paul (eds.), Causation and Counterfactuals. Mit Press. 277-290.
    J. L. Mackie (1965). Causes and Conditions. American Philosophical Quarterly 2 (4):245 - 264.

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